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In Saving the Freedom of Information Act, Margaret Kwoka offers
a deep empirical diagnosis of FOIA’s operational dysfunction. Her
data make unmistakably clear that FOIA is falling far short of its
public-serving aims. The story has a tragic arc. Kwoka shows us, at
the front of her book, the Act’s incredible potential as a tool of
press watchdogging and public oversight, then demonstrates how
and why it is incapable of achieving that potential. The reason is
overinclusiveness. Federal agencies are so swamped by requesters
with non-newsworthy, non-public-oversight purposes that they do
not have the time, resources, or incentives to respond well to
journalistic requests. By forcing FOIA to be everything to
everyone, Kwoka explains, we have left it unable to provide any
real system of accountability and transparency for anyone.
Kwoka’s structural proposals are eminently sensible. She describes
how we should disaggregate information services and disentangle
the press function from all the many other functions, so that the
press function can flourish. “Rather than trying to squeeze all of
the public’s needs for government information into FOIA,” we
need to reform the system to require or incentivize agencies to
meet other information requests differently, leaving FOIA to do the
work it was designed to do for the press—and, by extension, for all
of us (p. 179).
The book’s contribution—powerful in its own right—is actually
even broader, because these FOIA dynamics serve as a microcosm
of a much larger truth we have ignored to our peril for too long: the
specialness of the press function sometimes requires separate,
special protections for those performing it.
In many circumstances, of course, a broad umbrella of shared
rights for the press and the public is perfectly adequate. We all
have the right to choose the content of what we communicate and
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the right to express ourselves without prior restraint from the
government, for example, and there are few reasons to believe that
asking the press and the public to share those rights diminishes the
ability of either group to exercise them. They are not, and do not
need to be, specific press freedoms. But there are also times
when—statutorily, and even constitutionally—we should be
providing unique protection to those who, if empowered with
rights beyond those granted to all speakers, will use those rights to
benefit society as a whole. In these areas, our ongoing refusal to
conceptualize and legally recognize the specialness of the press
function has robbed us of public benefits.
If, for example, the press is not treated as special for purposes of
access to jails and granted something more than the access that is
given to every member of the public, that shared legal status has
consequences for the public. We cannot give every person in
America the access, so without some press specialness, there is
limited ability for any of us to keep an eye on the way our
government treats incarcerated people. Similarly, as a purely
practical matter, not all of us could feasibly be permitted to enter
border facilities, or disregard curfews at times of unrest, or seek
exceptions to officers’ dispersal orders during protests, or
occupy limited courtroom seats in a crowded criminal trial—and
having someone acting as the eyes and the ears of the public in
all of those settings is important. Likewise, if we need subsidies
to help sustain coverage of local public meetings and
investigation of important local issues, we cannot give these
dollars to every citizen in the town; we have to make judgments
about who is performing the true press functions that warrant
them.
In all of these settings, as with FOIA, a system of equivalent
rights may mean no meaningful rights at all. The consequences—
for governmental accountability, community discourse, and the
health of our democracy—are grave. Those performing the press
function simply cannot do what we need them to do if they are
clumped with everyone else. It harms them, but more importantly,
it harms us.
Scholars who have advocated for an invigorated role for the First
Amendment’s Press Clause or suggested that modern debates
about social-media regulation must be situated within the
framework of that Clause will be thrilled to see what a cogent
example Kwoka provides. And her work nudges us to think not
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only about how important a differentiated treatment of the press
might sometimes be, but also about who counts as the press for
purposes of these protections—or, more properly, what counts as
the press function, which has been the focus of much of my recent
work. While some might suggest that in our new media landscape
it has become increasingly difficult to identify “the press,” and
thus we should we should shy away from the endeavor of trying to
protect it, the opposite is true. Never has it been more important for
us to theorize the set of functions we need to support legally in
order to continue to reap the public benefits that come from those
functions.
Kwoka’s study sheds light here. It hones in on the key press
function of government oversight and shows the public benefits of
it—enlightening audience members, uncovering waste and abuse,
spurring policy change, exposing corruption, and checking the
power of police and national security agencies. It illustrates the
performance of this function by both legacy and non-legacy media.
And it makes the case that this function is valuable and worthy of
separate protection. We can (and should) continue to conceptualize
the sorts of functions that might signal that press specialness is at
work—for example, compensating for the public’s own
information-gathering and fact-checking limitations, acting as
surrogates or proxies for an audience of regular listeners in the
public, and engaging in what Justice Potter Stewart called the
“organized, expert scrutiny of government.” We can (and should)
continue to consider the doctrinal frameworks in which that
specialness can be legally acknowledged. The important first steps
are to see that these functions matter to our waning public
discourse and that expecting them to be protected in broad,
undifferentiated legal structures is both unreasonable and
dangerous.
Carving out these special protections for press functions in the
places they are needed is all the more important as the legacy press
decline. Newsroom closures, private-equity takeovers, and loss of
advertising dollars to tech companies mean the media
organizations that were once the primary instigators of publicserving, transparency-enhancing litigation and legislation
(including FOIA itself) now cannot or will not invest in those legal
efforts. In the past, the press had some sources of power it no
longer enjoys—staggering resources, symbiotic relationships with
government officials who did not yet have direct social-media
access to voters, favorable judicial attitudes, and the broader ability
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to engage in “self-help.” In that more powerful legacy-press era,
we might reasonably have expected that their efforts and influence
would preserve many of our most important societal press
functions. Today, they might not. Yet a healthy democracy
continues to demand these functions. Kwoka’s project shows the
value of legal structures that both embrace the specialness of them
and directly protect them.
The press is the recipient, but we are the beneficiaries.
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